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ABSTRACT
Releasing Web query logs which contain valuable infor-
mation for research or marketing, can breach the privacy
of search engine users. Therefore rendering query logs
to limit linking a query to an individual while preserving
the data usefulness for analysis, is an important research
problem. This survey provides an overview and discus-
sion on the recent studies on this direction.
1. INTRODUCTION
Web search queries are generally stored by search
engines for the purpose of improving result ranking,
query refinement, user modeling, language-based ap-
plications, and sharing data for academic research
or commercial needs [10]. On the other hand, releas-
ing such data without proper anonymization can se-
riously breach the privacy of search engine users. In
2006 the America Online (AOL) query log data of
650k users over three months, was released after re-
moving all explicit identifiers of searchers as shown
in Figure 1 [6]. Shortly after that, the searcher No.
4417749 was traced back to the 62-year-old widow
Thelma Arnold who lives in Lilburn. This scan-
dal made data publishers reluctant in providing re-
searchers with public anonymized query logs [22].
Since then, an important research problem opened
on rendering Web query log data to limit linking a
query to a specific individual while the data is still
useful for analysis.
1.1 Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing
Researchers in the field of privacy-preserving data
publishing focus on designing techniques to publish
data as useful as possible while preserving the pri-
vacy of individuals [19]. Publishing data instead of
publishing data mining results is much more use-
ful and interesting because many other analysis can
be done on such data. Thus the published data
should be potentially useful for many data analy-
sis objectives which makes privacy-preserving data
publishing challenging.
The process of anonymization [11][13] refers to
hiding the identity (or sensitive information) of in-
dividuals. Removing explicit identifiers (such as
name) is not effective since non-identifying personal
data (such as age, gender, zipcode) can be combined
with publicly available data to identify an individ-
ual [38]. The combination of such non-explicit iden-
tifiers are called the quasi-identifier (QI) attributes
[13], which could be used to identify an individual
with some sensitive attribute (SA) such as his dis-
ease.
1.1.1 Data Privacy Attacks
The most common privacy threats are record link-
age, attribute linkage, and table linkage, at which an
attacker tries to link a record of an individual to a
record in a published table, to a sensitive attribute
in a published table, or to the published data table
itself, respectively [19].
In record/attribute linkage, the attacker knows
the victims record is in the released table. If some
value on QI which matches victims QI, identifies
a small number of records, the victim can be dis-
tinguished with high probability. In table linkage,
however, the attacker does not know whether a vic-
tim exist in the released table and tries to determine
the presence/absence of the victims record. In some
other privacy models, we do not concern about such
linkage attack, but we concern about the change in
the attacker’s probabilistic belief on the SA value
of a victim after seeing the published data [19].
1.1.2 Data Privacy Models
We explain some well-known approaches to pre-
vent privacy attacks. The notion of k-anonymity
[36] is a solution to record linkage attacks, where
the QI of each record should be the same as at least
k-1 other records. This ensures that the probability
of linking an individual to a specific record based on
QI is at most 1k .
As a solution to attribute linkage attack, the `-
diversity notion [31] requires each group of records
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Figure 1: Sample query log from AOL released data [3]
Figure 2: A simple taxonomy tree
with the same QI, to have at least ` “well-represented”
SAs. This ensures that there are at least ` distinct
values for the SA in each such group, thus auto-
matically satisfies k-anonymity, where k=`. The `-
diversity could not prevent attribute linkage attacks
if the overall distribution of a SA is skewed. As a
solution, the notion of t-closeness [29] requires the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in any group on
QID to be close to the distribution of the attribute
in the overall table.
The (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy [18] guarantees that if at-
tacker’s prior knowledge on a SA value before data
release is at most ρ1 then after seeing the released
data, his posterior knowledge is bounded by ρ2,
where 0<ρ1<ρ2<1.
The notion of -differential privacy [15] guaran-
tees that the addition or removal of a “single” record
in the database will not significantly change the
statistical analysis results. -differential privacy as-
sures record owners that submitting their personal
information to the database is very secure.
1.1.3 Data Anonymization Techniques
We explain three major techniques to guarantee
privacy notions.
Generalization and Suppression: In suppres-
sion we delete some values, and in generalization
we replace some values with their less specific val-
ues. For the generalization, we replace categorical
attributes with respect to a given taxonomy, such
as the one shown in Figure 2. Values in numeri-
cal attributes are usually replaced with an interval
containing the original values.
In full-domain generalization [37], [38], all values
in an attribute are generalized to the same level of
the taxonomy tree. For example with taxonomy in
Figure 2, if Beef and Chicken are generalized to
Meat, then Apple, Orange and Banana should be
generalized to Fruit. In subtree generalization [7],
[24], either all child nodes or none are generalized.
For example, in Figure 2, this scheme requires that
if Beef is generalized to Meat, then the other child
node, Chicken, would also be generalized to Meat,
but Apple and Orange, which are child nodes of
Fruit, can remain ungeneralized. In cell generaliza-
tion [41], also known as “local recoding”, only some
instances of a value will be generalized compared to
“global recoding” in which if a value is generalized,
all its instances are generalized.
Major suppression techniques are Record suppres-
sion [7], [24], [37], and cell suppression (or local sup-
pression)[11] [32], which are processes of suppress-
ing an entire record, or suppressing some instances
of a given value in a database, respectively.
Anatomization and Permutation: In anato-
mization [40] the QI or the SAs are not modified and
instead the QI data and the SAs data will be pub-
lished in two separate tables: a QI table containing
the quasi-identifier attributes, a SA table containing
the sensitive attributes, and tables have one com-
mon GroupID attribute. In permutation method
[44] records are partitioned into groups and then
their SA values within each group will be shuffled.
Perturbation and Randomization: In pertur-
bation the original data values are replaced with
some synthetic data values in such a way that the
statistical information is preserved.The additive noise
technique [1][17] alters a sensitive numerical data
such as salary by adding a random value drawn from
some distribution. The data swapping method in
which SA values of records are exchanged, can pro-
tect numerical and categorical attributes[35]. Au-
thors in [18] also proposed a randomization approach
based on data swapping to limit the attacker’s back-
ground knowledge on inferring sensitive attributes.
1.2 Contributions and Paper Organization
In this survey, we provide an overview of the re-
cent studies in privacy-preserving Web query log
publishing. We explain privacy notions, attacks,
and the utility challenges in query log anonymiza-
tion. We categorize the recent privacy-preserving
query log publishing techniques into transactional
and non-transactional anonymity approaches.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we study the problem of query log
anonymization and its challenges. We categorize
the existing anonymization methods in Section 3
and summarize and discuss these methods in sec-
tion 4. We conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. PRIVACYPRESERVINGWEBQUERY
LOG DATA PUBLISHING
The problem of Web query-log anonymization have
been examined with [27], [2], and [10] from Web
community with focus on privacy attacks, and [17],
[3], [21], [39], [43], [23], [26], [33], [30], [9], and
[16] from the database community with focus on
transaction database anonymization. In this survey
we study both group of works and categorize them
into non-transactional and transactional anonymity
models respectively. However, the major part be-
longs to transactional model meaning that we treat
query logs as transaction data (unstructured data
without a fixed set of attributes), where each trans-
action represents a query and each item represents
a query term. Such data is a rich source for many
data mining applications such as association rule
mining, search recommendations, and etc.
2.1 Privacy Attacks on PublishedQuery Logs
Authors in [12], mentioned possible attacks on
published Web queries. Some sensitive information
can be obtained directly from query content such as
social security numbers, credit card numbers, etc.
Demographic and geographical information such as
location, etc. could also help attacker to find the
identity of a user. Even following the URL of pages
that a user clicked can reveal the users identity
when combined with his/her other queries. And
finally, when a userID was identified, the adversary
can easily discover all the users private queries by
looking at the entire search history.
2.2 Challenges in Anonymizing Query Logs
As mentioned earlier, query log data can be seen
as a special case of transaction data, where each
transaction contains several “items” from an item
universe. This item universe is typically very large,
say thousands of items (such as catalog items in
Amazon.com), and each transaction contains only
a few items. If each item is treated as a binary
attribute with 1/0 values, the transaction data is
extremely high-dimensional and sparse. There are
two main groups of challenges in anonymizing such
high-dimensional data.
2.2.1 Data Utility Challenge
Query log (or transaction data) anonymization
aims at preserving privacy while maintaining data
utility and reducing the information loss. However,
measuring the utility of the anonymized query logs
is not always clear. In case of suppression methods,
the information loss can be a simple count of sup-
pressed items. For generalization based techniques,
various metrics have been proposed to measure the
quality of generalized data including classification
metric, generalized loss metric [24], and discernibil-
ity metric [7]. Some specific transaction anonymiza-
tion loss measures are normalized centrality penalty
[23], and group generalization distortion [33]. Item-
set based utility [20] is another utility measure which
captures frequent itemsets in transaction data.
Apart from the utility measures mentioned above,
[20] mentioned two other aspects for practical use-
fulness of the anonymized data. The first is the
truthfulness of results, i.e. the analysis results (such
as support of frequent itemset) on the anonymized
data holds on the original data. The second is the
value exclusiveness, i.e. the items in the modified
data are exclusive of each other. This has a sig-
nificant impact on many data mining tasks based
on counting queries. For example, the local recod-
ing transformation [28] does not have this property.
Consider Figure 2, a local recoding can generalize
some occurrences of “Apple” and some occurrences
of “Orange”, to “Fruit”. Now, it is not possible to
count the number of transactions containing “Ap-
ple” or “Orange” from the modified data.
The major challenge for all query-log anonymiza-
tion is reducing the significant information loss of
the anonymized data. This is because each dimen-
sion (any search term) could be potentially sensitive
and a potential QID attribute used for record or at-
tribute linkages, thus employing traditional privacy
models, such as k-anonymity, would require includ-
ing all dimensions into a single QID. Consequently
lots of data has to be suppressed or generalized to
the top-most values in order to satisfy k-anonymity,
even for small values of k [19]. Although removing
sensitive terms based on the semantics of the search
term and context can help increasing the utility of
anonymized data, the removed sensitive terms can
still be predicted based on user’s other queries [25].
2.2.2 Data Privacy Challenge
Anonymized query log data has some privacy is-
sues which are even more important than the above
utility issues. Firstly, the assumption of having an
adversary with a very strong background knowledge
can drastically affect the anonymized data utility.
Therefore some researchers consider a bounded ad-
versary with a limited background knowledge (e.g.
by a maximum number of items) [20]. Although
this assumption can be realistic, it does not hold
for cases with unbounded adversary and thus pri-
vacy is breached.
Secondly, as discussed in [12], an adversary can
create multiple accounts and generate many queries
using those accounts to create special query pat-
terns (such as a lot of infrequent query, or a distin-
guishable signature), so that, when the search log is
sanitized and released, the adversary can use those
patterns to obtain private information about other
users. Such issues are still not well studied.
3. WEBQUERYLOGANONYMIZATION
TECHNIQUES
We classify the query log anonymization meth-
ods into two groups which models query logs dif-
ferently. The first group of works deals with query
logs almost as is, while the second group treat query
logs as a special case of high-dimensional transac-
tion data. In this section we briefly explain previous
representative works in each group. There might be
some other very recent works which are to some ex-
tent an incremental variation of these methods.
3.1 Non-Transactional Anonymity Models
3.1.1 Query Deletion and Hashing
Seven query log privacy-enhancing techniques was
discussed in [10], including deleting entire query
logs, hashing query log content, deleting user iden-
tifiers, deleting personal information in query con-
tent, hashing user identifiers, shortening sessions,
and deleting infrequent queries.
Log deletion is the most privacy-enhancing tech-
nique; however, the utility of data drops to zero.
Hashing queries is also not safe since other publicly
available data, such as previously released query
logs, or search engine statistics about queries in un-
hashed form, can be used to pinpoint an individual.
Similarly, hashing identifiers cannot guarantee elim-
inating the risk of privacy breach.
Even after removing identifying information it
may still be possible to link queries back to individ-
uals by using other publicly available information.
Although shortening sessions can be highly privacy-
protective, due to removal of the link between a user
and his/her entire query history, the query content
may still contain identifying information, and thus
the risks from accidental and malicious disclosure
will not be totally resolved. In addition, query logs
with short sessions are less useful for analysis.
Deleting queries that appear infrequently in the
logs was suggested in [2] as an effective way of re-
moving queries that contain identifying information.
Setting a threshold for being “infrequent” is how-
ever very challenging. Also studies showed that a
large number of queries in huge query log datasets,
occur a small number of times [8]. Consequently,
this approach may lead to deletion of a remarkable
amounts of non-identifying queries.
3.1.2 Token based Hashing
In token based hashing [27] a query is anonymized
by tokenizing each query term and securely hash-
ing each token to an identifier. One major problem
with this technique is that if an unanonymized ref-
erence query log has been released previously, the
adversary could apply co-occurrence analysis and
frequency analysis on the reference query log to ex-
tract statistical properties of query terms and then
processes the anonymized log to invert the hash
function based on co-occurrences of tokens within
queries. For example, if an adversary knows how
often the query “HIV treatment” appears in a pre-
viously released log can use the statistics to decipher
the separate hashes for “HIV” and “treatment”.
3.1.3 Secret Sharing and Split Personality
The secret sharing [2] anonymization method splits
a query into k random shares and publishes a new
share for each distinct user issuing the same query.
This technique guarantees k-anonymity because each
share is useless on its own and all the k shares are
required to decode the secret. This means that a
query can be decoded only when there are at least
k users issuing that query. The result is equivalent
to suppressing all queries issued by less than k users.
Since queries are typically sparse, many queries will
be suppressed as a result.
Split personality, also proposed in [2], focus on re-
ducing the possibility of reconstructing search his-
tory of a user by splitting the logs of each user
based on the user “interests”. For example, if a
user is interested in both Sport and Art, then he
will have two different profiles, one for the queries
about Sport, and the other for the queries related
to Art. In this way, the users become dissimilar to
themselves, however the distortion makes it more
difficult for researchers to correlate different facets.
The authors, however, provided no formal privacy
guarantee for this method.
3.2 Transactional Anonymity Models
The following works focused on transaction data
anonymization. However, some also mentioned query
log as a special case and used query log data in their
experiments.
3.2.1 Randomization Methods
An early work in transaction anonymizing was
applying randomization methods, where some items
are replaced with another and some ”false” items
are inserted into a transaction that looks like ”true”
items [17]. Given a transaction t, the anonymized
transaction t’ is generated in three steps: The ran-
domization operator selects j items from t, uni-
formly at random with some probability (without
replacement) and places them into t’. It considers
each item not in t and with some probability adds
it to t’.
In another randomization approach [18], the au-
thors proposed (ρ1, ρ2)-privacy which guarantees that
if attacker’s prior knowledge on a property Q(t) of a
transaction t before data release is at most ρ1 then
after seeing the released randomized transaction t’,
his posterior knowledge is bounded by ρ2, where
0<ρ1<ρ2<1. They presented a method for find-
ing the perturbation probabilities that maximizes
the expected value of |t∩ t’| while ensuring (ρ1, ρ2)-
privacy.
3.2.2 Coherence Method
The coherence method [43] eliminates both record
linkage attacks and attribute linkage attacks. The
(h, k, p)-coherence privacy criterion requires that at
least k transactions must have any subset of at most
p non-sensitive items and at most h percent of these
transactions have some sensitive item. This ensures
that, for an attacker with the power p, the prob-
ability of linking an individual to a transaction is
limited to 1/k and the probability of linking an in-
dividual to a sensitive item is limited to h.
Let β denote the adversary’s background knowl-
edge that a transaction contains some non-sensitive
items. An attack is modeled in the form of β → e,
where e is a sensitive item. Let Sup(β) denote the
support of β i.e., the number of such transactions.
P (β → e) = Sup(β ∪ {e})/Sup(β) is the proba-
bility that a transaction contains e given that it
contains β. The breach probability of β, denoted
by Pbreach(β) is the maximum P (β → e) for any
private item e. Assume an adversary’s background
knowledge is up to p non-sensitive items, i.e., |β| ≤
p. If Sup(β) < k, the adversary is able to link an
individual to a transaction (record linkage attack)
and if Pbreach(β) > h, the adversary is able to link
an individual to a sensitive item (attribute linkage
attack).
A mole, is any background knowledge (at most to
the size p) that can result in a linking attack. Co-
herence aim at eliminating all moles. For a setting
of (h, k, p), an itemset β, with |β|≤p and Sup(β)>0,
is called a mole if Sup(β) < k or Pbreach(β) >
h. The data D is (h, k, p)-coherent if D contains
no moles. Authors in [43] applied the total item
suppression technique to enforce (h, k, p)-coherence.
Total suppression of an item refers to deleting the
item from all transactions containing it. Although
total suppression results in a high information loss
when the data is sparse, it has two nice properties:
(1) eliminating all moles containing the suppressed
item, and (2) keeping the support of any remaining
itemset, equal to the support in the original data.
The latter one implies that any result derived from
the modified data, also holds on the original one
which is not hold for partial suppression.
Since an optimal solution to (h, k, p)-coherence,
i.e. with minimum information loss (suppressed
items) is NP -hard [43], authors proposed a heuris-
tic solution. They defined minimal moles as those
moles that contain no proper subset as a mole in
which removing them is sufficient for removing all
moles. An algorithm similar to the well-known Apri-
ori algorithm for mining frequent itemsets, was used
to find all minimal moles.
One problem with the coherence method is the
scalability issue considering exponential growth of
itemsets. In a similar work, [42] suggested using sets
of maximal and minimal itemsets, called borders.
These borders are typically much smaller than the
full sets of all itemsets that they represent, thus
their solution requires much less space and time.
3.2.3 Band Matrix Approach
An anonymization method is proposed in [21] to
prevent attribute linkage attacks for high-dimensional
data with sensitive items, using a band matrix tech-
nique. In a band matrix, non-zero entries are con-
fined to a diagonal band and zero entries on either
side. In such a matrix, rows correspond to trans-
actions and columns correspond to items, with the
0/1 value in each entry. In their method, items
are divided into sensitive items, and non-sensitive
items. A non-sensitive transaction, is a transaction
with no sensitive items and sensitive transactions
are those with at least one sensitive item.
A transaction set T has privacy degree of p if
the probability of associating any transaction t∈T
with a particular sensitive item does not exceed 1p .
To achieve this privacy requirement, [21] suggested
applying two phases: (1) transforming the data to
a band matrix (using Reverse Cuthill-McKee algo-
rithm) with respect to non-sensitive attributes, and
(2) grouping each sensitive transaction with non-
sensitive transactions or sensitive ones with differ-
ent sensitive items. The intuition why such band
matrix formation is helpful, is that it organizes data
such that consecutive transactions are very likely to
share many common non-sensitive items and this
results in a smaller reconstruction error.
In the second phase each sensitive transaction will
be grouped with non-sensitive transactions or sen-
sitive ones with different sensitive items. A greedy
algorithm based on the “one-occurrence-per-group”
heuristic, was proposed in [21] which allows only one
occurrence of each sensitive item in a group.
3.2.4 km-Anonymity
To address the record linkage attacks in transac-
tion data, [39] proposed the km-anonymity notion
which assumes that any subset of items can be used
as background knowledge. In this method unlike
coherence and band matrix approach, data is not
distinguished as sensitive and non-sensitive, but it
is considered both as potential quasi-identifiers and
potential sensitive data. It assumes, like the coher-
ence method, that an adversary knows at most m
number of items as background knowledge.
A transaction database is km-anonymous if for
any set of up to m items, there exist at least k trans-
actions that contain those items in the published
database. We can consider this privacy notion as
a special case of (h, k, p)-coherence with h = 100%
and p = m, meaning that a subset of items that
causes violation of km-anonymity is a mole under
the coherence model.
The anonymization method in [39] applies gen-
eralization in form of the global recoding scheme in
which when a child node is generalized to its parent,
all its sibling nodes will also be generalized to their
parent node, and the generalization process is ap-
plies to all transactions in the database. Each gen-
eralization corresponds to a possible horizontal cut
of the taxonomy tree. The information loss of a cut
is measured using the normalized certainty penalty
loss metric [41] which captures the degree of gener-
alization of an item i, by considering the percentage
of leaf nodes under i in the item taxonomy.
If a cut results in a km-anonymous database, then
all its more general cuts, also result in a km-anonymous
database. This is called the monotonicity property
of cuts [39]. The km-anonymization problem is to
find a km-anonymous transformation with the min-
imum information loss. Based on the monotonicity
property and in order to prevent higher informa-
tion loss, as soon as we find a cut that satisfies the
km-anonymity constraint, we do not have to find a
more general cut.
Generating the set of all possible cuts and check-
ing the anonymity violation for every subset of up to
m items is not applicable for large, realistic prob-
lems. Thus, authors proposed a greedy heuristic
method called Apriori anonymization (AA) which
is based on the apriori principle: if an itemset J
of size i, violates the anonymity requirement, then
each superset of J also violates the anonymity re-
quirement. It explores the space of itemsets in an
apriori, bottom-up scheme. Meaning that before
checking if `-itemsets (` = 2,. . . , m) violates the
anonymity requirement, we first eliminate the pos-
sible anonymity violation caused by (`-1)-itemsets.
This method drastically reduces the number of item-
sets that must be checked at a higher level, since
detailed items could have been generalized.
3.2.5 Transactional k-Anonymity
The assumption of bounded background knowl-
edge of an adversary in the coherence and the km-
anonymity methods, has two limitations. Firstly,
in many cases it is not possible to determine this
bound in advance. Secondly, these methods can en-
sure k-anonymity (with p or m set to the maximum
transaction length in the database) only if adver-
sary’s background knowledge is limited to the pres-
ence of items. If the background knowledge is on
the “absence” of items, the adversary may exclude
transactions and focus on fewer than k transactions.
For example, consider an adversary who knows that
Bob has bought “Orange” and “Chicken”, but has
not bought “Milk”. Suppose that three transac-
tions contain “Orange”, and “Chicken”, in which
two of them contain “Milk”. The adversary can
exclude the two transaction containing “Milk” and
link the remaining transaction to Bob. Here, km
privacy with k=2 and m=3 is violated, even by set-
ting m to the maximum transaction length.
The k-anonymity approach in [23], which we re-
fer to as the Partition method, avoids this prob-
lem since all transactions in the same equivalence
class are identical. They extended the original k-
anonymity for relational data [37] [38], to the trans-
actional k-anonymity for “set-valued data”, in which
a set of values are associated with an individual.
A transaction database D is k-anonymous if every
transaction in D occurs at least k times. Authors
in [23] showed that every database which satisfies
k-anonymity, also satisfies km-anonymity for all m
values, however, the reverse does not always hold.
The Partition method is the extended version
of the top-down Mondrian [28] algorithm for rela-
tional data. In this method, if several items are
generalized to the same item, only one occurrence of
the generalized item will be kept in the generalized
transaction. It starts with the single partition con-
taining all transactions with all items generalized to
the root item. Then it recursively splits a partition
by specializing a node in the taxonomy for all the
transactions in the partition. Next all the trans-
actions in the partition with the same specialized
item are distributed to the same sub-partition. At
the end of distribution, some small sub-partitions
with less than k transactions are merged into a spe-
cial leftover sub-partition to be redistributed. The
partitioning stops if k-anonymity condition is vio-
lated. Unlike the Apriori anonymization [39], the
Partition approach follows a local recoding scheme.
3.2.6 Clustering-Based k-Anonymity
The Partition method suffers from significant in-
formation loss for two reasons. Firstly, it stops par-
titioning the data at a high level of the taxonomy
because the exponential branching for generating
sub-partitions quickly diminishes the size of a sub-
partition and causes k-anonymity violation. This is
especially true for query logs with large and diverse
item universe. Secondly, it does not deal with item
duplication in the generalized transaction. In fact
preserving term frequency (as much as possible) is
an important issue for many applications such as
TFIDF used by ranking algorithms.
Authors in [33], adopted the the privacy notion of
transactional k-anonymity [23] and proposed a clus-
tering approach to query log anonymization as a so-
lution to the above shortcomings of the Partition
method. The main idea in [33] is grouping “sim-
ilar” transactions together, to reduce the amount
of required generalization and suppression to make
them identical. For example, the generalized trans-
action for <Apple> and <Milk> is <Food>, and
for <Apple> and <Orange> is <Fruit>. Clearly
the former entails more information loss. Therefore,
the transaction anonymization can be treated as a
clustering problem such that each cluster must con-
tain at least k transactions and these transactions
should be “similar”.
They defined a transaction as a bag of items (thus
allowing duplicate items). A transaction t’ is a gen-
eralized transaction of a transaction t, if each item
i’∈t’ represents (the generalization of) one “distinct”
item i ∈ t. This transaction model has two dis-
tinctions from [23]. First, it allows duplicate items
in a transaction and in its generalized transaction.
For example if t’=<Fruit, Fruit> is a generalized
transaction of t, t’ represents two leaf items under
Fruit in t. Second, it allows items in a transaction
to be on the same path in the item taxonomy while
each item represents a distinct leaf item. For exam-
ple, we interpret the transaction <Fruit, Food>
as: Fruit represents a leaf item under Fruit and
Food represents a leaf item under Food that is not
represented by Fruit.
The least common generalization (LCG) was pro-
posed as a way to measure the similarity of a subset
of transactions. The LCG of a set of transactions
S, is a common generalized transaction for all of the
transactions in S, and there is no other more spe-
cial common generalized transaction. The authors
devised an efficient linear-time bottom-up item gen-
eralization algorithm to compute LCG. Authors
proposed group generalization distortion (GGD) as
a measure to capture both generalization and sup-
pression distortion of a set of transactions. They
formulated the transaction anonymization as the
problem of clustering a set of transactions into clus-
ters of size at least k such that the sum of GGD of
LCG of all clusters is minimized. Since the problem
is NP -hard, they presented a heuristic linear-time
algorithm, called Clump, which unlike Partition,
preserves duplicate items after generalization.
3.2.7 Heuristic Generalization with Heuristic Sup-
pression
Authors in [30] were motivated by the limitations
of the km-anonymity, and proposed to integrate the
global generalization technique in [39] with the total
item suppression technique in [43] for enforcing km-
anonymity. They applied full subtree generalization
technique [39], meaning that a generalization solu-
tion Cut is defined by a cut on a taxonomy tree
with exactly one item on every root-to-leaf path.
Since the full subtree generalization can suffer from
excessive distortion in the presence of outliers, sup-
pressing a few outlier items will reduce information
loss caused by high amount of generalization. They
applied total item suppression technique, which re-
moves some items of Cut from all transactions. The
loss metric is the aggregate of both generalization
and suppression.
The anonymized data is derived in two steps: first
the items are generalized with respect to the Cut
and then some items of the Cut are suppressed in
all transactions. Since the number of cuts for a tax-
onomy is exponential in the number of items, enu-
merating suppression scenarios for a cut is also in-
tractable. Consequently, authors provided a heuris-
tic approach to address this issues.
3.2.8 Sketch-based Anonymization
The sketch-based privacy-preserving approach [3]
reduces the dimensionality of the data by produc-
ing a much smaller number of features to represent
the data. This technique is specifically effective for
high-dimensional sparse data such as query logs.
The idea is to replace a user’s search history by a
set of sketches. Two privacy criteria associated with
this technique are δ-anonymity and k-variance.
The δ-Anonymity ensures that the uncertainty
in the reconstructed value of each term frequency
is at least δ. As noted in [3], a disadvantage of
δ-anonymity is that it treats each user indepen-
dently regardless of whether there are other users
similar to him/her. They argued that it is desir-
able to give outliers (users who use unique terms)
more protection than users who are similar to many
others. Thus, they define the k-variance which en-
sures that any user’s sanitized search history cannot
be easily distinguished from its k-nearest neighbors.
They described algorithms for δ-anonymity and k-
variance using suppression.
3.2.9 Semantic Microaggregation
The anonymization method in [16], clusters the
queries and then replace the original queries by the
centroids of the corresponding clusters considering
the semantics of the queries. Authors argued that
creating a cluster with queries from users with dif-
ferent “interests” can result in useless protected logs
and thus queries of users with common interests be-
tween them should be grouped in the same cluster.
They used Open Directory Project 1 to compute
the semantic distances between users and partition
queries into groups of k users with similar inter-
ests. In the aggregation phase, they compute a new
user as the representative (or centroid) of the clus-
ter, which summarizes the queries of all the users
of the cluster. The query items for the centroid are
selected by a probabilistic approach based on the
contribution of the user with respect to number of
transactions in the cluster.
3.2.10 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [15] is one of the state-of-
the-art techniques for ensuring privacy and is more
robust to attacks than any other existing privacy
definitions. The notion of differential privacy was
applied for search queries in [26] which adds a ran-
dom noise to any statistic of a search log such as a
term frequency. This random noise is drawn inde-
pendently from the Laplace distribution with mean
zero and a scaling parameter. The algorithm out-
put contains frequent queries with noisy statistic of
the queries and the clicked URLs.
3.2.11 ρ-Uncertainty
The privacy notion ρ-uncertainty [9] ensures that
the confidence of any sensitive association rule is at
most ρ, while truthful association rules can still be
derived. Like the works in [21], and [43], they dis-
tinguish between public (non-sensitive) and private
(sensitive) items. Formally, a ρ-uncertain transac-
tion set D does not allow an attacker knowing any
1http://www.dmoz.org/
subset of a transaction t∈D to infer a sensitive item
in t with confidence higher than ρ.
The authors proposed a technique that combines
global generalization over non-sensitive items and
selective global suppression of some items. This no-
tion is similar to (h, k, p)-coherence, however, the
ρ-uncertainty model allows an adversary with some
prior knowledge on the private items.
4. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Privacy Preservation
In this survey we considered two models for query
log anonymization: non-transactional model and
transactional model. Although the techniques men-
tioned in non-transactional model in Section 3.1
protect privacy to some extent, there is a lack of for-
mal privacy guarantee. For example, the release of
the AOL query log still leads to the re-identification
of a search engine user even after hashing users iden-
tifiers [6]. This is because the query content itself
may be used together with publicly available infor-
mation for linking attacks.
In the transactional model we consider Web query
logs as unstructured transaction data and therefore
focus on query-log anonymization from transaction
database anonymization point of view. Such a mod-
eling, however, might not be a good idea since there
are strong correlations between keywords within a
query (based on natural language), and between
queries within a single session. This is not true of
transactions. Utilizing these correlations can help
develop better solutions for the problem in the fu-
ture.
Among the previous work in transaction anonymiza-
tion, the coherence [43] approach can both prevent
record linkage attacks and attribute linkage attacks.
band matrix [21] and ρ-uncertainty [9] approach can
prevent attribute linkage attack, and both km-anonymization
[39] [30] and k-anonymization [23] [33] prevent record
linkage attack.
Both km-anonymization and k-anonymization, do
not distinguish data as sensitive and non-sensitive
but as potential QI and SA. In fact, determining
which items are sensitive is not always possible in
many real applications considering huge size of the
item universe. The adversary’s background knowl-
edge is bounded in coherence and km-anonymization,
while in band matrix and k-anonymization we do
not limit the attacker’s knowledge. A security is-
sue about bounded knowledge in coherence and km-
anonymization was explained by [23] that if back-
ground knowledge is on the “absence” of items, the
attacker may exclude transactions using this knowl-
edge and focus on fewer than k transactions. The
HgHs approach also has this privacy issue.
For the sketch-based privacy-preserving approach
[3], authors in [12] argued that one should be careful
of releasing the (pseudo)randomly generated values
that were used in the sanitization process in [3] since
this may allow attackers to reconstruct the original
data which is a privacy breach.
While applying differential privacy for search queries
[26] is very promising, like every existing privacy
definition, it is susceptible to active attacks. The
assumption that users behave honestly may lead to
privacy breach. If an attacker creates multiple ac-
counts and in some of his first queries issues a pri-
vate query such as someone else’s credit card num-
ber, it could result in publishing this private data
by the search engine.
4.2 Utility Preservation
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, important utility
factors for the anonymized data are item general-
ization/suppression loss, truthfulness, itemset util-
ity, value exclusiveness, and item frequency.
Authors in [42] and [43] assume that the taxon-
omy tree for transaction data tend to be flat and
fanout, and thus decided to use item suppression
instead of generalization. In this case, employing
generalization loses more information than employ-
ing item suppression. However, if the transaction
database is too sparse, then the item suppression of
the coherence may cause a large information loss. If
the data is sparse and the taxonomy is “slim” and
“tall”, the generalization scheme in km-anonymization
and the k-anonymization could work better, while if
the taxonomy is “short” and “wide”, generalization
causes larger information loss [20][33].
Data analysis on anonymized data is considered
truthful with respect to the original data if the anal-
ysis results obtained from the modified data holds
on the original data [20]. The coherence approach
and km-anonymity approaches guarantee truthful
analysis while it is not the case for the k-anonymization.
The analysis of frequent itemsets [5], i.e., the
items that co-occur frequently in transactions, has a
vast application in data mining applications such as
association rule mining, search recommendations,
and etc. Thus preserving itemsets is an important
utility factor. Among the discussed approaches, co-
herence and band matrix can preserve such itemset
utility.
The local generalization in transactional k-anonymity
approach has a smaller information loss than global
generalization, however, the anonymized data does
not have the value exclusiveness, which is impor-
tant to preserve for many data mining algorithms.
This means that new algorithms must be designed
to analyze such data [20].
Most of the previous works in transaction data
anonymization do not deal with item duplication
meaning that the frequency of a term in a query
can not be preserved well and will affect utilities
such as count query results. For example the in-
formation loss of k-anonymity method in [23] can
be high due to item generalization, and eliminat-
ing duplicate generalized item. The latter reason
of information loss was not measured by an usual
information loss metric for relational data where no
attribute value will be eliminated by generalization.
Authors in [33], however, designed their anonymiza-
tion method in such a way which preserves item
frequency.
There is no guarantee for minimum data distor-
tion in the semantic microaggregation technique [16]
while computing the centroid for the clusters. More-
over, authors did not consider item generalization
and its cost in their model. For The sketch-based
privacy-preserving approach [3], it is interesting to
see if it would be useful for anonymizing real search
logs, and when we only have sanitized search logs,
what kinds of search log analysis can still be con-
ducted with acceptable accuracy.
5. CONCLUSION
Publishing Web query logs for research/marketing
is restricted by privacy concerns. On the other
hand, achieving a suitable trade off between pri-
vacy and utility of query log data is a challeng-
ing problem. We surveyed some recent studies on
query log anonymization and categorized them into
two groups based on how they treat queries. Major
works consider query logs as transaction data and
apply techniques to guarantee a desired level of pri-
vacy. While there is progress in privacy-preservation
of published query logs, preserving data utility is
still a challenging issue.
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